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Abstract: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) focuses on Anaxagoras (ca. 500–428 BC) because he 
considers him as a precursor of the the later Neoplatonic concept all things exist in all things in their own 
mode, which became the core of Pico’s metaphysics. Anaxagoras’s philosophy permits Pico to establish his 
doctrine that all things share a portion of God within them, in their own way. Pico rejects the fixed position 
of man in the ontological hierarchy. Man has the chance to become everything. Pico asserts that man con-
tains all things in himself as their center, just like God contains all things as their origin. As a consequence, 
Anaxagoras’s principle is supportive to Pico’s metaphysics. Furthermore, Anaxagoras’s metaphysical prin-
ciple is supportive of Pico’s method of allegorical interpretation, which is indispensable for his syncretism 
and his attempt to reveal hidden truths in every text or level of reality.  
Keywords: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Anaxagoras, Plotinus, Proclus, Neoplatonism, Intellect, Demi-
urge, homoiomereia, metaphysics, cum in ipsa ita sunt omnia, ut in ipsa omnia sint ipsa. 
 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) is well known for his attempt to enrich 
his sources by resorting to philosophical traditions that were not well known to 
fifteenth-century humanists so as to broaden his scope.1 In the first half of the fifteenth 
century, Diogenes Laertius’s Vitae Philosophorum was translated in Latin by 
Ambrogio Traversari.2 Earlier partial Latin translations of the work were probably 
produced during the Middle Ages by Henricus Aristippus in the twelfth century. At 
least one medieval version of Diogenes Laertius’s Vitae Philosophorum was available 
to Walter Burley (1275–1344/5), the Prehumanists in Verona, and Petrarch’s friend 
Dionigi da Borgo S. Sepolcro (d. 1342), as several sources attested.3 Diogenes Laer-
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1 F. Borghesi et al., “Overview of the Text,” Pico della Mirandola: Oration on the Dignity of Man, A 
New Translation and Commentary, ed. F. Borghesi, M. Papio and M. Riva (Cambridge 2012) 90–96; B. 
Copenhaver, “Magic and the Dignity of Man: De-Kanting Pico’s Oration,” The Italian Renaissance in the 
Twentieth Century: Acts of an International Conference. Florence, Villa I Tatti, June 9–11, 1999, ed. A. 
Griego, M. Rocke, and F. G. Superbi (Firenze 2002) 295–320; B. Copenhaver, “The Secret of Pico’s Ora-
tion: Kabbalah and Renaissance Philosophy,” Renaissance and Early Modern Philosophy, Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy, ed. P. French, H. Wettstein and B. Silver, vol. XXVI (Boston 2002) 56–81; B. Copenhaver, 
“Number, Shape, and Meaning in Pico’s Christian Kabbalah: The Upright Tsade, The Closed Mem, and the 
Caping Jaws of Azazel,” Natural Particulars: Nature and Disciplines in Renaissance Europe, ed. A. Grafton 
and N. Siraisi (Cambridge 1999) 25–76; E. Garin, History of Italian Philosophy, ed. & trans. G. Pinton 
(Amsterdam 2008) 311–312; C. Joost-Gaugier, Pythagoras and Renaissance Europe: Finding Heaven 
(Cambridge 2009) 30–31, 87–92; B. Ogren, Renaissance and Rebirth: Reicarnation in Early Modern Italina 
Kaballah (Leiden 2009) 212–237; C. Wirszubski, Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism 
(Cambridge MA 1989) 3–10; F. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (Chicago 1964) 84–
116. 
2 E. Garin, “La prima traduzione latina di Diogene Laerzio,” Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 33 
(1959) 283–285; M. Gigante, “Ambrogio Traversari interprete di Diogene Laerzio,” Ambrogio Traversari 
nel VI centenario della nascita, Convegno internazionale di studi, Camaldoli–Firenze, 15–18 sett. 1986, Atti 
di convegni / Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento (Book 17), ed. G. C. Carfagnini (Florence 1988) 
367–459; J. Kraye, “The Revival of Hellenistic Philosophies,” The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. J. Hankins (Cambridge 2007) 98–99; C. Stinger, Humanism and the Church Fathers: Am-
brogio Traversari (1386–1439) and the Revival of Patristic Theology in the Early Italian Renaissance (New 
York 1977) 30–34, 70–79. 
3 L. Malusa, “Renaissance Antecedents to the Historiography of Philosophy,” Models of the History of 
Philosophy: From its Origins in the Renaissance to the ‘Historia Philosophica’: Volume I: From Its Origins 
in the Renaissance to the `Historia Philosophica, ed. G. Santinello, F. Bottin (Dordrecht 1993) 7; J. T. 
2                                                                            GEIRGIOS STEIRIS 
 
tius’s work became an additional source on Presocratic philosophy in the fifteenth 
century and contributed to the revival of the interest in the field. In addition, Renais-
sance scholars derived indirect information about the Presocratics from the works of 
Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers, especially the Neoplatonists, who 
commented on the Presocratic philosophy. Pico della Mirandola writes that, without 
any kind of obligation, he decided to study all the teachers and schools of philosophy.4 
Eclecticism is the bedrock of his philosophy. In addition to ancient Greek philosophy, 
his research also includes the Presocratic philosophy. Pico was contentious and he 
seemed to enjoy philosophical disputes, despite the different readings of his works. As 
a result, in his effort to engage in heated philosophical debates and promote human 
understanding, he is not afraid to challenge the established ideas and criticize even key 
theological doctrines.5 This article seeks to explore the ways in which Giovanni Pico 
della Mirandola treated the philosophy of Anaxagoras (ca. 500–428 BC), the philoso-
pher who transmitted the Ionian tradition to Athens, so as to formulate his own philos-
ophy. Pico focuses on Anaxagoras because he considers him as a precursor of the the 
later Neoplatonic concept omnia sunt in omnibus modo suo (all things exist in all 
things in their own mode), which became the core of Pico’s metaphysics. I will also 
attempt to identify Pico’s sources and correct common misinterpretations of Pico’s 
text in prior scholarship.   
In his Conclusiones, Pico comments on Anaxagoras: 
  
3>21. Per predictas conclusiones intelligi potest, que sit omiomeria Anaxagorae, quam opi-
fex intellectus distinguit.6 (Through the preceding conclusions one can understand what 
Anaxagoras’s homoeomeria is, which the demiurge of the intellect distinguishes.)7 
 
3>22. Nemo miretur quod Anaxagoras intellectum appellauerit immixtum, cum sit maxime 
mixtus, quia maxima mixtio coincidit cum maxima simplicitate in natura intellectuali.8 (Let 
no one marvel that Anaxagoras called the intellect unmixed, although it is greatly mixed, 
since the greatest mixture coincides with the greatest simplicity in the intellectual nature.)9 
 
Muckle, “Greek Works Translated Directly into Latin Before 1350,” 2nd Part, Medieval Studies 5 (1943) 
110; T. Ricklin, “Vorsokratiker im lateinischen Mittelalter II: Thales von Milet im lateinischen Diogenes 
Laertios von Henricus Aristippus bis zur lateinischen editio princeps (1472/1475),” The Presocratics From 
the Latin Middle Ages to Hermann Diels, Akten der 9. Tagung der Karl und Gertrud Abel-Stiftung vom 5.–
7. Oktober 2006 in München, ed. O. Primavesi and K. Luchner (Stuttgart 2011) 111–156; Stinger, Human-
ism and the Church Fathers (n. 2 above) 71–72. 
4 G. Pico della Mirandola, “De hominis dignitate,” De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno, e  
scritti vari a cura di Eugenio Garin (Edizione nazionale dei classici del pensiero italiano), ed. E. Garin 
(Firenze 1942) 138; G. Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, On Being and the One, Heptaplus, 
trans. C. G. Wallis, P. J. W. Miller and D. Carmichael, intro. P. J. W. Miller (Indianapolis 1998) 21.  
5 F. Borghesi, “A Life in Works,” Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed.  M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge 
2008) 215–216; S. A. Farmer, Syncretism in the West: Pico’s 900 Theses (1486), The Evolution of Tradi-
tional Religious and Philosophical Systems (Tempe 1998) 1–58; E. Garin, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: 
Vita e dottrina (Florence 1937) 72–89. 
6 G. Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones sive Theses DCCC,” Syncretism in the West: Pico’s 900 The-
ses (1486), The Evolution of Traditional Religious and Philosophical Systems, ed. S. A. Farmer (Tempe 
1998) 3>21. 
7 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 405. 
8 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 3>22.  
9 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 405. 
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Pico focuses on homoiomereia (ὁμοιομέρεια), the original homogenous state of things 
according to Anaxagoras,10 who holds the view that objects are temporary mixtures of 
ingredients, while the original state is that of universal mixture.11 Anaxagoras12 shares 
with Parmenides13 the principle that what-is is without start or stop.14 The Intellect 
(Νοῦς), a distinct cosmic entity, sets the mixture into rotary motion: everything is 
mixture and separation of ingredients.15 Pico correlates the philosophy of Anaxagoras 
with the conclusion that cum in ipsa ita sunt omnia, ut in ipsa omnia sint ipsa (when in 
itself all things exist in such a way that in itself all things are itself).16 The later 
Neoplatonic concept Πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ (all things in all things, but 
in each according to its proper nature),17 as Proclus expresses it in his Institutio Theo-
logica—and not in Theologia Platonica as S. A. Farmer inaccurately suggests in his 
edition of Pico’s Conclusiones18—seems very interesting to Pico and becomes the 
core of his philosophy: omnia sunt in omnibus modo suo.19 The Neoplatonic concepts, 
especially that the whole is in the part and that all things are in all, are of crucial im-
portance for Pico’s philosophy.20 According to Pico, there are four worlds: the ultra 
mundane, which corresponds to the intelligible realm of the Platonists or the angelic 
realm of the theologians; the celestial; the sublunary; and the human. Since everything 
 
10 H. Diels, W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin 1952) 59 B1 25–27; ibid. DK 59 A45 
(Aristoteles, Physica, 203a19–24); ibid. DK 59 A45a (Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros 
commentaria, 9.460.4–26); ibid, DK 59 A41 (Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria, 
9.27.2–12); ibid. DK 59 A46 (Aristoteles, De generatione et corruptione, 314a18); ibid. DK 59 A46a (Ae-
tius I, 3, 5).  
11 Aristoteles, “Physica,” Aristotelis physica, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1950, repr. 1966) 187a26–b2; P. 
Curd, “Anaxagoras,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalt, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/anaxagoras/; P. Curd, trans. & ed., Anaxagoras of 
Clazomenae, Fragments and Testimonia, A Text and Translation With Notes and Essays by Patricia Curd 
(Toronto 2007) 222; D. W. Graham, The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy, The Complete Fragments and 
Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, trans. & ed. D. W. Graham (Cambridge 2010) 317–318; G. 
S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratric Philosophers (Cambridge 1983) 358; D. Sedley, 
Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (Los Angeles, Berkeley 2007) 13–19. 
12 DK (n. 10 above) 59 B17. 
13 DK (n. 10 above) 28 B8, 27–28. 
14 D. J. Furley, “Anaxagoras in Response to Parmenides,” Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. II, 
ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany 1983) 70–92; D. Graham, “Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Responses to 
Parmenides,” The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long (Cambridge 1999) 
159–180; R. D. McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates (Second Edition): An Introduction with Texts and 
Commentary (Indianapolis 2011) 199; R. Roecklein, Plato versus Parmenides, The Debate Over Coming-
into-Being in Greek Philosophy (Plymouth 2011) 68–80; J. Sisko, “Anaxagoras’s Parmenidean Cosmology: 
Worlds within Worlds within the One,” Apeiron 26 (2003) 87–114.  
15 Simplicius, “In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria,” Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum libros 
octo commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 9 & 10, ed. H. Diels (Berlin 1882, 1895) 9.300.31– 
9.301.1. 
16 DK (n. 10 above) 59 B6, B12; Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Fragments and Testimonia (n. 11 
above) 178–191; Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 114, 405; Pico, Conclusiones (n. 6 above) 
3.20; G. Mathews, “On the Idea of There Being Something of Everything in Everything,” Analysis 62 
(2002) 1–4. 
17 Proclus, “Institutio Theologica,”  Proclus. The elements of theology, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford 1963, 
repr. 1977) 103.1; R. Chlup, Proclus: An Introduction (Cambridge 2012) 83–91. 
18 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 320. 
19 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 24.17; T. Leinkauf, Mundus combinatus: Studien 
zur Stuktur der barocken Universalwissenschaft am Beispiel Athanasius Kirchers SJ (1602–1680) (Berlin 
1993) 83–91. 
20 Michael Allen, “The Birth Day of Venus: Pico as a Platonic Exegete in the Commento and the Hepta-
plus,” Pico della Mirandola, New Essays, ed.  M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge 2008) 106. 
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is in every world, anything that occurs in one world has references to the others.21 The 
same Neoplatonic concept could also be traced back to Syrianus,22 who ascribed it to 
the Pythagoreans, as well as Iamblichus,23 who ascribed it to Numenius.24 It is worth 
noticing that Anaxagoras’s principle that everything is in everything, according to 
Plotinus,25 should be applied solely at the level of Intellect and not at the level of mat-
ter, a rather peculiar, although interesting for Pico’s argumentation, interpretation.26 
Pico, at first sight, as modern scholarship suggests, seems to follow Proclus and ignore 
or disregard Plotinus’ argumentation on the subject.27  
Notwithstanding the fact that Pico in Heptaplus, his biblical commentary, has cer-
tain doubts, he argues that Anaxagoras, as expounded by the Pythagoreans and the 
Platonists, holds that whatever is in any of the three worlds is at the same time con-
tained in each:  
 
Quam Anaxagorae credo fuisse opinionem, si recte eum sensisse putamus, explicatam 
deinde a Pythagoricis et Platonicis.28 (If we have understood him rightly, I believe that this 
was the opinion of Anaxagoras, as expounded by the Pythagoreans and the Platonists.)29 
 
Pico’s interprets Anaxagoras’s argument in such a loose manner in order to corrobo-
rate his own views. Pico, as his phrasing suggests, was not persuaded that the ancient, 
medieval commentators and he personally understood and interpreted properly the 
philosophy of Anaxagoras. Garin suggests that Pico draws on Simplicius, who is his 
main source for Anaxagoras.30 Although Garin argues that Pico relies on a certain 
passage, in which Simplicius exposes Anaxagoras’s fundamental doctrines,31 there is 
also another, at least, passage from which Pico would have drawn.32 Furthermore, 
Pico owned and had access to Aristotle’s Physics, various copies of Simplicius’s In 
Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria, and the eleventh-century Byzantine 
polymath Michael Psellus’s In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentarium.33 Pico’s 
reference to Pythagoreans and Platonists, in the plural, indicates that, besides Syrianus 
 
21 G. Pico della Mirandola, “Heptaplus,” De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno, e scritti vari a 
cura di Eugenio Garin (Edizione nazionale dei classici del pensiero italiano), ed. E. Garin (Firenze 1942) 
185–188. 
22 Syrianus, “In Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria,” Syriani in metaphysica commentaria, Commen-
taria in Aristotelem Graeca 6.1., ed. W. Kroll (Berlin 1902) 178.28–29. 
23 Joannes Stobaeus, “Anthologium,” Ioannis Stobaei anthologium, ed. O. Hense and C. Wachsmuth 
(Berlin 1884–1912) 1. 49. 32. 69–72. 
24 Proclus, The Elements of Theology (n. 17 above) 254.  
25 Plotinus, “Enneades,” Plotini opera, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (Leiden 1951–1973) V. 8. 4. 5–
11. 
26 G. Stamatelos, Plotinus and the Presocratics, A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in 
Plotinus’ Enneads (New York 2007) 149. 
27 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 86–87.  
28 Pico della Mirandola, “Heptaplus” (n. 21 above) 188. 
29 Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man (n. 4 above) 77. 
30 Pico della Mirandola, “Heptaplus” (n. 21 above) 188. 
31 Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria (n. 15 above) 9.27. 
32 Ibid.  9.460–462.  
33 P. Kibre, The Library of Pico della Mirandola (New York 1936) 172, 178, 181, 186, 188, 256, 264, 
294; Anthony Grafton, “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Trials and Triumphs of an Omnivore,” Commerce 
with the Classics: Ancient Books and Renaissance Readers (Ann Arbor 1997) 93–134. 
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and Iamblichus, Pico probably had read Psellus’s text.34 Pico, as well as other 
fifteenth-century humanists, thought of Psellus as the collector and purveyor of 
ancient mystic wisdom, including the Chaldean Oracles, the Orphic Hymns, and 
Pythagorean wisdom.35 Pico in certain cases draws from Psellus’s works on magic and 
the Chaldeans.36 Besides the aforementioned works, Pico owned and studied several 
medieval commentaries on Physics, but these works certainly do not belong to the 
Platonic and Pythagorean tradition.  
But Pico at the same time distanced himself from Anaxagoras. Pico argues, ac-
cording to Farmer’s translation, that there is a Demiurge of the Intellect, who distin-
guishes homoiomereia. In addition Pico contends that the Intellect is greatly mixed, 
because the greatest mixture coincides with the greatest simplicity in the intellectual 
nature.37 On the contrary Anaxagoras is adamant: the Intellect is separate, unaffected, 
and unmixed. It does not contain a portion of everything, because otherwise it could 
not set things to move. If it mixes with one, it will mix with all. According to Anaxa-
goras everything which separates itself contains all things, besides the Intellect.38 It is 
worth noting that Pico seems to follow Averroes and the Averroists on the Intellect, 
maintaining the unicity of the Intellect, despite the fact that he seems to endorse in a 
rather perplexed manner the personal immortality of the soul.39  
 
34 Michael Psellus, “In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentarium,” Michael Psellos Kommentar zur 
Physik des Aristoteles, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina, ed. L .G. 
Benakis  (Athens 2008) 1. 14. 7–30, 1. 15. 1–15, 3. 12. 20–35. 
35 N. Brann, The Debate Over the Origin of Genius During the Italian Renaissance (Leiden 2002) 84–
86; D. Hayton, “Michael Psellos's De daemonibus in the Renaissance,” Reading Michael Psellos, ed. C. 
Barber and D. Jenkins (Leiden 2006) 205–227; S. Rossbach, Gnostic Wars: The Cold War in the Context of 
a History of Western Spirituality (Edinburgh 1999) 118–120; S. Toussaint, “Zoroaster and the Flying Egg: 
Psellos, Gerson and Ficino,” Laus Platonici Philosophi, Marsilio Ficino and His Influence, ed. S. Glucas, P. 
Forshaw and V. Rees (Leiden 2011) 105–115; P. Zambelli, White Magic, Black Magic in the European 
Renaissance: From Ficino, Pico, Della Porta to Trithemius, Agrippa, Bruno (Leiden 2007) 46, 56, 67.   
36 Pico della Mirandola, “De Hominis Dignitate” (n. 4 above) 128, 152; Borghesi et al., “Overview” (n. 
1 above) 91, 133; Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 486–487. 
37 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 3>21, 3>22. 
38 DK (n. 10 above) 59 B12; J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, Volume 2: Empedocles to 
Democritus (London 1979) 105–107; Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Fragments and Testimonia (n. 11 
above) 52, 121–122, 196–212; McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates (n. 14 above) 216–220; J. Magee, 
Unmixing the Intellect: Aristotle on the Cognitive Powers and Bodily Organs (Westport 2003) 58–60; C. J. 
Vamvakas, The Founders of Western Thought—The Presocratics: A diachronic parallelism between 
Presocratic Thought and Philosophy and the Natural Sciences (Springer 2009) 203–206. 
39 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 7.2, 7.4; Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium 
Magnum in Aristotelis ‘De Anima’ libros. (Averroes’ Aristotle, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Corpus 
Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem series—versio Latina vol. VI, 1), ed. F. S. Crawford (Cambridge, 
MA 1953) III.5, 387.23, 388.56, 400.379–393, 401.419–423, 404.500–405.520, 412.724–728; J. Aertsen, 
“Aquinas’s philosophy in its historical setting,” The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. N. Kretzmann 
(Cambridge 1993) 25; R. Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden 1995) 
113–137; H. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect : Their Cosmologies, Theories of the 
Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (New York and Oxford 1992) 282–294; L. Gauthier, 
“Saint Thomas, Averroes et l’ averroisme,” Aquinas and Problem of His Times, ed. G. Verbeke and D. 
Verhelst (Leuven 1976) 161–177; D. N. Hasse, “The Attraction of Averroism in the Renaissance: Vernia, 
Achillini, Prassicio,” Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, ed. P. 
Adamson et al. (London 2004) 131–147; D. N. Hasse, “Aufstieg und Niedergang des Averroismus in der 
Renaissance: Niccolo` Tignosi, Agostino Nifo, Francesco Vimercato,” ‘‘Herbst des Mittelalters’’? Fragen 
zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts, ed. J. A. Aertsen et al. (Berlin 2004) 447–73; O. Leaman, 
Averroes and His Philosophy (Oxon and New York 2013) 82–117, 163–178; C. N. Still, “Pico’s Quest for 
All Knowledge,”Pico della Mirandola, New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge 2008) 187.  
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 Aristotle, who follows in a certain point Anaxagoras’s theory on the Intellect, alt-
hough he shares Plato’s criticisms,40 notes that Anaxagoras failed to explain how 
Intellect comes to think.41 The immateriality of the Intellect is inconsistent with the 
materiality of its objects.42 Aquinas agrees with Anaxagoras that the Intellect should 
command all because it is perfectly unmixed.43 Also Averroes subscribes to Anaxago-
ras’s argument in his Commentary on the De Anima.44 Pico probably follows Cusanus 
and the great majority of the medieval scholastics who tried to combine divine sim-
plicity and creatural multiplicity, safeguarding God’s indirect knowledge of es-
sences.45 In addition Pico argues that any contradiction in the intellectual nature is 
compatible,46 a possible aura of the philosophy of Heraclitus.47  
Farmer suggests that Pico’s vocabulary indicates that he is relying on a Neoplatonic 
commentary on Aristotle’s Physics that Farmer could not identify.48 I argue that Pico 
draws from Simplicius’s In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria. The similarity 
of the two passages is obvious:  
 
Per predictas conclusiones intelligi potest, que sit omiomeria Anaxagorae, quam opifex in-
tellectus distinguit.49 (Through the preceding conclusions one can understand what 
Anaxagoras’s homoeomeria is, which the demiurge of the intellect distinguishes.)50 
 
καὶ ὁ νοῦς δὲ παρὰ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ διακοσμῶν καὶ κινῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰς ὁμοιομερείας διακρίνειν 
αὐτάς λέγεται.51 (And in Anaxagoras, Mind, which arranges and moves the homoeomeries 
from the beginning, is said “to separate” them.)52 
 
40 Plato, “Phaedo,” Platonis opera, vol. 1, ed. J. Burnet (Oxford 1900, repr. 1967) 97b8ff. 
41 F. Brentano, Aristotle and His World View, trans. & ed. R. George and R. Chisholm (Berkeley 1978) 
78–80; M. Nyvlt, Aristotle and Plotinus on the Intellect: Monism and Dualism Revisited (Lanham 2012) 
108–109.  
42 Aristoteles, “De Anima,” Aristotle. De anima, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1961, repr. 1967) 405b19–23, 
429a18–19, b21–29; J. Sisko, “Aristotle and the Modern Mind,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Collo-
quium in Ancient Philosophy, ed. H. J. Cleary and G. S. J. Gurtler (Leiden, Boston, Koln 2001) vol. XVI 
2000, 185–187. 
43 T. Aquinas, “De unitate intellectus contra Avveroistas,” Aquinas against the Averroists, On There Be-
ing Only One Intellect, trans & ed. R. McInerny (West Lafayette 1993) II. 20. 369–380, II. 92. 139–143; T. 
Aquinas, Sentencia Libri De anima, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 45/1 Commissio Leonina 
(Roma, Paris 1984) lib. 1 l. 3 n. 8, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 10, lib. 1 l. 3 n. 11, lib. 1 l. 5 n. 5, lib. 1 l. 5 n. 14, lib. 3 l. 7 n. 
7lib. 3 l. 7 n. 7, lib. 3 l. 7 n. 8, lib. 3 l. 7 n. 9, lib. 3 l. 9 n. 1; T. Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, Opera 
omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 40 D (Rome 1968) c. 1. 
44 Averroes, In de anima, (n. 39 above) III, comm. 4, 5, 19; Averroes, On Aristotle's “Metaphysics”: An 
Annotated Translation of the So-called "Epitome,” ed. R. Arnzen (Berlin, New York 2010) 243; Averroes, 
“Long Commentary on De Anima, bk. III, 1–5,” Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy: Selected Readings 
Presenting the Interactive Discourses Among the Major Figures, ed. R. Bosley and M. Tweedale (Peterbor-
ough 2006) 677; P. Huby and D. Gutas, Theoprastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and 
Influence, Commentary, Volume 4, Psychology (Leiden 1999) 137–138; Averroes, “Long Commentary on 
‘The Soul’ 3.5, 3.18–3.20,” Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions, 
ed. A. Hyman, J. Walsh and T. Williams  (Indianapolis 2010) 304–305; M. N. Ovey, Averroes’ Doctrine of 
Immortality, A Matter of Controversy (Waterloo 1984) 84.  
45 E. Cassirer, “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola,” Renaissance Essays, ed. P. O. Kristeller and P. Wiener 
(Rochester 1968) 24–32; Wirszubski, Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism (n. 1 above) 
100ff.  
46 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 3>13. 
47 DK (n. 10 above) 22 B10, B50; G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, A Critical Study with 
Introduction, Text and Translation (Cambridge 1954) 94–96. 
48 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 405. 
49 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 3>21. 
50 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 405. 
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Pico could also have drawn from John Philoponus’s In Aristotelis physicorum libros 
commentaria, although Philophonus’s wording is slightly different: 
 
Πανταχοῦ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν ἐπαινεῖ ὅτι νοῦν ἐπέστησε διακοσμήσει τοῦ παντός, πάσας εἶναι 
λέγων τὰς ὁμοιομερείας μεμιγμένας καὶ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ διακρινομένας.53 (He 
praises Anaxagoras that he set Mind to arrange everything, claiming that all the homoio-
mereias, which are mixed, are put into motion while they are differentiated by the mind.) 
 
But there is an important difference: Simplicius and Philoponus holds that the Intellect 
distinguishes the homoiomereias (ὁμοιομερείας), in the plural, while Pico supports that 
the opifex intellectus distinguishes the omiomeria, in the singular. Homoiomereia, in 
the singular, is mentioned in DK 59 A45a.54 In this passage is obvious that homoio-
mereia does not refer to the original mixture or to something similar to the meaning 
that Pico gives to the word. 
  Aristotle, the ancient expert on Presocratics, cites the plurals homoiomere 
(ὁμοιομερή) and homoiomereiai (ὁμοιομέρειαι). Aristotle uses the word homoiomere 
consistently.55 But subsequent authors and commentators, including several Middle 
Platonists and Neoplatonists, are not so careful in their writings leading to misinter-
pretations and chancy readings.  Simplicius, who was familiar enough with Anaxago-
ras’s philosophy, embraces the Aristotelian interpretation of homoiomere (ὁμοιομερή), 
while he equates homoiomereiai (ὁμοιομέρειαι) with seeds (σπέρματα).56 Anaxagoras 
refers to seeds, which are present in the original mixture and contain, as the original 
mixture, at the same time the opposites and the natural essences.57 Previous scholar-
ship has demonstrated that Anaxagoras himself never used the concept homoio-
mereia.58 After Aristotle, homoiomere, homoiomereiai, and other plurals were com-
mon in texts which refer to Anaxagoras. On the contrary, the singular homoiomereia 
was not so common. We can trace the singular homoiomereia mainly in Lucretius, 
Simplicius, Themistius, and John Philoponus, but the term does not reflect Anaxago-
 
51 Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria (n. 15 above) 10.1318. 29–30.  
52 Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 8.6–10, trans. R. McKirahan (London 2001) 103.  
53 Joannes Philoponus, “In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria,” Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis 
physicorum libros octo commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 16 & 17, ed. H. Vitelli (Berlin 
1887, 1888) 17.833. 2–4. 
54 DK (n. 10 above) 59 A45a (Aristoteles, Physica, 203a19–24); Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum 
libros commentaria (n. 15 above) 9.460. 4–5. 
55 Aristoteles, “De caelo,” Aristote. Du ciel, ed. P. Moraux (Paris 1965) 302a31–32, 302b13–16; 
Aristoteles, “De generatione et corruptione,” Aristote. De la génération et de la corruption, ed. C. Mugler 
(Paris 1966) 314a11–29; Aristoteles, “Metaphysica,” Aristotle’s metaphysics, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford 1924, 
repr. 1970) 988a28; Aristoteles, Physica (n. 11 above) 203a20–23. 
56 Simplicius, “In Aristotelis quattor libros de caelo commentaria,” Simplicii in Aristotelis de caelo 
commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca , ed. J. L. Heiberg (Berlin 1894) 9.603.17–19; J. Barnes, 
The Presocratic Philosophers (New York 1982) 250–253; R. M. Dancy, Two Studies in the Early Academy 
(New York 1991) 5–9, 57–59; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (n. 11 above) 
376–378; Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Fragments and Testimonia (n. 11 above) 153–177; G. Vlastos, 
Studies in Greek Philosophy, v.1: The Presocratics, ed. Daniel W. Graham (New Jersey 1993) 303–327.  
57 P. Curd, “Anaxagoras,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (n. 11 above); Barry Sandywell, 
Presocratic Reflexivity: The Construction of Philosophical Discourse c. 600–450 BC, vol. III (London 
2003) 374–376; J. Warren, Presocratics: Natural Philosophers before Socrates (Berkeley 2007) 132. 
58 R. Brown, “Lucretian Ridicule of Anaxagoras,” The Classical Quaterly 33. 1 (1983) 146–160.  
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ras’s teaching in an accurate fashion.59 It is very probable that Pico opted for the use 
of the concept homoiomereia following Lucretius, who uses the word as a stereotyped 
general expression in order to describe and refute Anaxagoras’s philosophy.60 Pico’s 
interpretation of homoiomereia looks also similar to that of John Philoponus, who 
describes a single homoiomereia which contains all the beings in a way very similar to 
that of Pico.61  
Furthermore, Anaxagoras never refers to a possible creator of the Intellect. As 
noted earlier, Pico’s reference to the Demiurge and his phrasing suggests that he was 
drawing from Simplicius’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. But given that Pico 
pursued a systematic study of Neoplatonism, he should have been familiar with the 
idea that the Intellect (Νοῦς), the image of the One, is an emanation of the One.62  Ac-
cording to Plotinus, the One remains in his undifferentiated unity and is not the Demi-
urge.63 Plotinus asserted that the Intellect is identical to the Platonic Demiurge 
(Δημιουργός),64 as described in Timaeus.  Intellect contains the world of the Demiurge 
and is not the result of emanation or creation from the Demiurge.65 Moreover, Plotinus 
criticized Anaxagoras that the latter’s Intellect (Νοῦς) could not be temporally prior to 
matter; instead it is concurrent.66 Even in the later Neoplatonists the scheme of emana-
tion guarantees that the One is not a Demiurge. The cosmos is a product of the work of 
the lower hypostases, namely Intellect and Soul (Ψυχή).67 In the Conclusiones, accord-
ing to Porphyry, Pico admits that the Demiurge of the world is the supermundane soul:  
 




59 Lucretius, “De rerum natura,” Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex, ed. C. Bailey (Oxford 
1947) I.830–834; Simplicius, In Aristotelis quattuor libros de caelo commentaria (n. 56 above) 7.605.18–
31, 606.2; Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria (n. 15 above)  9.172.1–21, 9.460.5–10;  
Themistius, “In Aristotelis physica paraphrasis,” Themistii in Aristotelis physica paraphrasis, Commentaria 
in Aristotelem Graeca 5.2, ed. H. Schenkl (Berlin 1900) 5, 2.15.14; Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis 
physicorum libros commentaria (n. 53 above)  16.24.25, 16.103.20, 16.106.17, 16.396.22–25, 16.397.18–
19, 17.833.11.  
60 Lucretius, De rerum natura (n. 59 above) I.830–834; W. E. Leonard and S. B. Smith, ed., De rerum 
natura: The Latin Text of Lucretius (Madison 1942) 282;  D. N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation 
of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge 1998) 124–126, 145–146; W. J. Tatum, “The Presocratics in Book 1 of Lu-
cretius’ De rerum natura,”  Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Lucretius, ed. M. Gale (Oxford 2007) 
132–145; J. Warren, “Lucretius and Greek Philosophy,” The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, ed. S. 
Gillespie and P. Hardie (Cambridge 2007) 19–32.  
61 Joannes Philoponus, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria (n. 53 above) 16.24.25, 16.100.32, 
16.106.7, 16.396.24; E. Garin, History of Italian Philosophy (n. 1 above) 1.298. 
62 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above)  V. 1. 7, V. 1. 4. 6–8. 
63 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above)   II. 3. 18. 15, IV. 4. 9. 9, V. 2. 1, V. 6. 4, VI. 9. 6; Nyvlt, Aristotle 
(n. 41 above) 16.  
64 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above)   II. 4. 7, III. 9. 1, V. 9. 5. 
65 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above) II. 3. 18, III. 8. 8. 32–39, V. 2. 1; F. Schroeder, “Plotinus and Lan-
guage,” The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. L. P. Gerson (Cambridge 1996) 339–340; Stamatelos, 
Plotinus (n. 26 above) 62. 
66 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above) II. 4. 7. 2–13. 
67 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above) III. 8. 4, V. 9. 5, IV. 4. 11; Proclus, Institutio Theologica (n. 17 
above)  28, 38, 57. 18–26.  
68 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 22.2. 
69 Farmer, Syncretism in the West  (n. 5 above) 307. 
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Pico draws from Proclus’s In Timaeum, where Proclus summarizes the basic argu-
ments of Porphyry on the creation myth of the Platonic dialogue.70 In the Conclu-
siones according to Iamblichus, Pico adds that the seventh of the intellectual hierarchy 
is the Demiurge of the sensible world.71 Apparently Pico traces in Proclus evidence 
that Iamblichus prefigured the henads.72 As a result, Pico’s argument, according to 
Farmer’s translation, that the Demiurge of the Intellect distinguishes the omiomeria, 
misinterprets Anaxagoras as well the Neoplatonists.  
I believe that the problem arises not from Pico’s text but from Farmer’s translation 
(opifex intellectus = Demiurge of the Intellect), which is incorrect and misleading. In 
my reading, in Pico’s phrase opifex intellectus the noun intellectus is not a genitive but 
a nominative form, since the noun intellectus belongs to the fourth declension. As a 
result, the correct translation is Demiurge-Intellect, as in apposition, which seems to 
be accurate according to the Neoplatonic philosophy. Plotinus associates the Demiurge 
with Intellect and not with the One,73 despite Porphyry’s slightly different view.74 
Iamblichus follows the general pattern of Plotinus’s argumentation and places Demi-
urge in the realm of the Intellect. Syrianus follows respectively on the same path. Fi-
nally, Proclus supports that the Demiurge exists in the Intellect.75 Moreover, if my 
reading is correct, Pico’s argument no longer opposes the philosophy of Anaxagoras 
who claims that the Intellect sets the original mixture in motion and is not its Demi-
urge.76 We have to bear in mind that Anaxagoras does not call the Intellect Demiurge 
nor does he conflate Intellect with God or divine principle, despite Iamblichus’s quo-
tation.77 We must also have in mind that in the Commento Pico blames Ficino for the 
latter’s attempt to compromise emanationism and creationism.78  Moreover, Pico’s 
endeavor to present Moses philosophizing on the emanation of all things from God 
remains on the level of verbal expression and is not a well documented and articulated 
view.79 It is merely a rhetorical exaggeration, which aims to strength Pico’s 
syncretism in the Heptaplus.80 Thus, any attempt to justify Farmer’s translation, with 
the argument that Pico tried, in the specific passage, to compromise emanation and 
creation, is doomed to fail.  It is also worth noticing that according to Pico, as I 
mentioned earlier, being and One are coextensive, identical principles and must exist 
 
70 Proclus, “In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria,” Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 
ed. E. Diehl (Leipzig 1903–1906, repr. Amsterdam 1965) 1:300. 
71 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n. 6 above) 23.2. 
72 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 311. 
73 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above) II. 1. 5, II. 3. 18, II. 4. 7, III. 9. 1.  
74 Proclus, In Timaeum (n. 70 above)  307.4–5. 
75 S. Klitenic-Wear, The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides (Leiden 2011) 76–
78, 87–89.  
76 DK (n. 10 above) 59 12. 14–17; Aristoteles, Physica (n. 11 above) 256b25 ff; G. Betegh, The Derveni 
Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation (Cambridge 2004) 278–305. 
77 Iamblichus, “Protrepticus,” Iamblichi protrepticus ad fidem codicis Florentini, ed. H. Pistelli (Leipzig 
1888) 48. 16–21. 
78 G. Pico della Mirandola, “Commento alla canzone d’ amore,” De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De 
ente et uno, e  scritti vari a cura di Eugenio Garin (Edizione nazionale dei classici del pensiero italiano),  
ed. E. Garin (Firenze 1942) 466; Allen, “The Birth Day” (n. 20 above) 94; Farmer, Syncretism in the West 
(n. 5 above) 21; Garin, History of Italian Philosophy (n. 1 above) v. 1, 305. 
79 Pico della Mirandola, “Heptaplus” (n. 21 above) 176.  
80 P. R. Blum, Philosophy of Religion in the Renaissance (Farnham 2010) 133. 
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in some mode in every level of reality; One is not prior to being.81 Pico reaches this 
conclusion through his explanatory method, which suggests that the words we use so 
that we describe the levels of reality can be linked to the same words we use in order 
to describe other levels.82 If this is the case, then the correct meaning of the phrase 
opifex intellectus is once again Demiurge—Intellect and not Demiurge of the Intellect. 
Pico simply denominates. Otherwise, we have to admit that Pico has no thorough 
knowledge of Presocratic and Neoplatonic philosophy or that his philosophy is not so 
concrete.  
Although this a possible explanation, according to Pico’s wording and the general 
meaning of the aforementioned passages of the Conclusiones, Pico sets forth another 
view in his Commento, a work which is written almost the same period with the Con-
clusiones. Pico holds that God creates Intellect, a perfect and unique creation. Despite 
the ambiguous wording of the passage, the last word is indicative: 
 
dico che Iddio ab aeterno produsse una creatura di natura incorporea ed intelletuale, tanto 
perfetta quanto è possibile e’ sia una cosa creata.83 (God from eternity produced a creature of 
incorporeal and intellectual nature, as perfect as is possible for a created being.) 
 
In addition, Pico supports that Intellect, according to the Platonists, is the sole direct 
creation of God: 
 
immediatamente non proviene altra creatura che questa prima mente.84 (immediately no 
other creature proceeds but this first mind.) 
 
But the problem still persists. Pico uses three times words that refer to creation, while 
in the specific and subsequent chapters he prefers produsse, producere, and other 
forms of the verb produco. Pico’s terminology does not seem to be consistent enough. 
A possible explanation would be that in the specific chapter Pico’s priority is the re-
jection of Ficino’s argument that God creates directly also the human souls.85 Further-
more, Pico mentions as his sources Plotinus, the famous Platonists, Aristotle, and all 
the Arabs, notably Avicenna. The harmonization of the opinions of the aforemen-
tioned philosophers on the Intellect is rather superficial and not the outcome of solid 
argumentation. In the mid-1480s Pico’s philosophy was not coherent.86 In addition, 
Pico’s argumentation is ambivalent. He seems to lie simultaneously in Christian and 
Neoplatonic ground. Pico admits that, according to the Neoplatonists, the Intellect is 
 
81 G. Pico della Mirandola, “De Ente et Uno,” De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno, e scritti 
vari a cura di Eugenio Garin (Edizione nazionale dei classici del pensiero italiano), ed. E. Garin (Firenze 
1942) 400–406, 426–434; R. Klibansky, “Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: a 
chapter in the history of platonic studies,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies I (1941–1943) 315–322; P. O. 
Kristeller, “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and his sources” Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, ed. 
P. O. Kristeller (Rome 1993) vol. 3, 254. 
82 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 28–29. 
83 Pico della Mirandola, “Commento” (n. 78 above) 465.  
84 Ibid. 466. 
85 S. Niccoli, trans. & ed., Marsilio Ficino, El libro dell’ amore (Firenze 1987) 4.4; Allen, “The Birth 
Day” (n. 20 above) 94. 
86 Allen, “The Birth Day” (n. 20 above) 94; M. Sudduth, “Pico della Mirandola’s Philosophy of Reli-
gion,” Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge 2008) 68–69. 
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an emanation from the One and not a creation per se.87 According to Michael Allen, 
Pico adds that God created the Ideas in the Intellect.88 But Pico’s text does not offer 
any evidence to support Allen’s argument. Pico once again prefers types of the verb 
produco instead of creo. The two verbs indicate different philosophical perspectives, 
as it is obvious. Although Pico seems to be confused, the use of words that refer to 
creation would be interpreted as rather loose interpretation of the Neoplatonic theory 
on the Intellect, since the general wording of the phrases suggests that creatura im-
plies the emergence of One’s thought and thinking. The same confusion could be 
found and in other passages of Pico’s Commento.89 But Pico insists. Later in the 
Commento he argues that Intellect (mente angelica) consists of potency and act. Po-
tency, the unlimited is equated with matter and act, the limit, is form.90 The Aristote-
lian flavor of his philosophy is obvious despite the fact that Pico mentions a passage 
from the Platonic Philebus.91 Intellect, like created things, is consisted of different 
principles. But potency is imperfection. Furthermore, as Allen suggests, Pico’s view 
lacks consistency.92 Pico’s contradictions have further implications. In another 
passage he describes the Intellect (anima intellettuale e angelica) in a different way: 
unformed substance, the original prime matter, took form by God and became 
Intellect.93 This is not an act of pure creation, according either Christians or the 
Neoplatonists. In favor of my translation of Pico’s phrase opifex intellectus as 
Demiurge—Intellect is Pico’s unambiguous affirmation that the Intellect creates the 
universe: dalla quale poi era produtto el resto del mondo (from which is produced the 
rest of the world).94 Similar arguments are reproduced and in other passages of the 
Commento.95  
Anaxagoras’s quotation is crucial for Pico. Pico found in Anaxagoras the oldest an-
cient source which supported his key thesis that all things exist in all things in their 
own mode, although he has the impression that Moses shared the same view.96  
Anaxagoras’s philosophy permits Pico to establish his doctrine that all things share a 
portion of God within them, in their own way. As a result, humans are capable of 
achieving true knowledge and felicity. Philosophy is simply the ladder to God.97 De-
spite the fact that Pico upholds the general pattern of medieval metaphysics, he rejects 
the fixed position of man in the ontological hierarchy. His anthropocentrism is preva-
lent. Man has the chance to become everything. Pico asserts that man contains all 
things in himself as their center, just like God contains all things as their origin:  
  
 
87 Pico della Mirandola, “Commento” (n. 78 above) 467–468. 
88 Allen, “The Birth Day” (n. 20 above) 95. 
89 Pico della Mirandola, “Commento” (n. 78 above) 511. 
90 Ibid. 472. 
91 Plato, “Philebus,” Platonis opera, ed. J. Burnet (Oxford 1901, repr. 1967) 2.23c. 
92 Allen, “The Birth Day” (n. 20 above) 97. 
93 Pico della Mirandola, “Commento” (n. 78 above) 480–481. 
94 Ibid. 511. 
95 Ibid. 472–473. 
96 Pico della Mirandola, “Heptaplus” (n. 21 above) 187–189. 
97 Pico della Mirandola, “De hominis dignitate” (n. 4 above) 118; Pico della Mirandola, “Heptaplus,” 
VII, Proemium (n. 21 above) 324–338; Sudduth, “Pico” (n. 86 above) 61–80. 
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quod Deus in se omnia continet uti omnium principium, homo autem in se omnia continet uti 
omnium medium.98 (God contains all things in himself as their origin, and man contains all 
things in himself as their center.)99 
As a consequence, Anaxagoras’s principle is supportive to Pico’s metaphysics.100 Fur-
thermore, Anaxagoras’s metaphysical principle is supportive to Pico’s method of alle-
gorical interpretation, which is indispensable for his syncretism and his attempt to 
reveal hidden truths in every text or level of reality.101 
But the crucial question is if and to what extent Anaxagoras’s philosophy influ-
enced Pico’s thought. Anaxagoras assumes that all things are found together in the 
original mixture and everything is in everything at all times. But this mixture was un-
limited (ἄπειρον), undifferentiated and exists eternally.102 As a result, creatio ex 
nihilo, which Pico defends, in a typical Platonic vocabulary and fashion, especially in 
his Heptaplus,103 is not compatible with Anaxagoras’s model. In addition, it is not 
clear whether Pico was aware of the fact that Anaxagoras’s Intellect is the only thing 
in which the principle everything in everything does not apply,104 since the Intellect is 
not mixed, let aside that Anaxagoras’s Intellect is corporeal.105 Pico refutes instead 
Anaxagoras’s argument and insists that the Intellect is greatly mixed, since maxima 
mixtio coincidit cum maxima simplicitate in natura intellectuali (since the greatest 
mixture coincides with the greatest simplicity in the intellectual nature).106 Pico ex-
presses a similar view in the Commento, where he argues that only God is without 
discord, while the Intellect, as a mixture of potency and act, is composed of discord 
and concord.107 Anaxagoras’s wording suggests that there are some things in which 
Intellect is present, while in others Intellect is not present.108 It is possible that Pico, 
despite his reliance on Proclus’s thought, follows Plotinus’s and not Proclus’s inter-
pretation of Anaxagoras’s philosophy concerning the principle everything in every-
thing.109 Plotinus’s interpretation, although attempted in passing, is convenient for 
Pico’s view that the greatest mixture coincides with the greatest simplicity in the in-
tellectual nature.110 Farmer holds that Pico comes to that paradoxical conclusion so as 
to reconcile Averroism and Christianity on the thorny issue of personal immortality.111 
Once again Farmer’s argument is doubtful, since Pico calls Averroes an infidel, whose 
 
98 Pico della Mirandola, “Heptaplus” (n. 21 above) 302. 
99 Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man (n. 4 above) 135. 
100 Pico della Mirandola, “De hominis dignitate” (n. 4 above) 104–106. 
101 Sudduth, “Pico” (n.  86 above) 69.  
102 DK (n. 10 above) B12. 
103 Allen, “The Birth Day” (n. 20 above) 104; C. Black, Pico’s Heptaplus and biblical hermeneutics 
(Leiden 2006) 214–225; Cassirer, “Giovanni Pico” (n. 45 above) 24; Wirszubski, Pico della Mirandola’s 
Encounter with Jewish Mysticism (n.1 above) 103–105. 
104 DK B11.  
105 Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (n. 11 above) 365. 
106 Pico della Mirandola, “Conclusiones” (n.  6 above) 3>22; Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 
above) 405. 
107 Pico della Mirandola, “Commento” (n. 78 above) 495–496; Allen, “The Birth Day” (n. 20 above) 97.  
108 DK (n. 10 above) B11; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (n. 11 above) 366. 
109 Plotinus, Enneades (n. 25 above) V. 8. 4. 5–11; Stamatelos, Plotinus (n. 26 above) 149.  
110 Farmer, Syncretism in the West (n. 5 above) 321. 
111 Ibid. 113–114. 
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views are interesting solely for academic disputation.112 Despite Pico’s intentions, 
Plotinus’s interpretation is supportive for Pico’s argumentation. Furthermore, Pico was 
forced to concede, although he did not do it, that, as Plato suggested,113 while 
Anaxagoras’s explanation is not simply materialistic,114 is a solid physical explanation 
since there is no answer on the question why the intellect arranges things in the best 









112 G. Pico della Mirandola, “Apologia,” Opera omnia Ioannis Pici Mirandulae (Basel 1557) 237; P. R. 
Blum, “Pico, Theology, and the Church,” Pico della Mirandola, New Essays, ed. M. V. Dougherty (Cam-
bridge 2008) 44. 
113 Plato, Phaedo (n. 40 above) 95a–100a. 
114 D. W. Graham, “Anaxagoras: Science and Speculation in the Golden Age,” Early Greek Philosophy: 
The Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason, ed. J. McCoy (Washington DC 2013) 145–146. 
